I. Introduction

In his 1895 poem "In the Neolithic Age," itinerant British poet Rudyard Kipling wrote, "the wildest dreams of Kew are the facts of Khatmandhu / And the crimes of Clapham chaste in Martaban." \(^1\) Over a century later, though, the effects of travelers' forbidden experiences are discussed on television, online, and at the United Nations. Increasingly, national governments concern themselves with the problem of their citizens traveling abroad for sexual encounters that would be forbidden at home.

This paper explores the possible bases for U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over U.S. child sex tourists; that is, U.S. nationals who travel abroad to have sex with children. Part II discusses the first use of 18 U.S.C. 2423(c), a 2003 federal statute that prohibits traveling in foreign commerce and engaging in sexual activities with a minor; this part also...
provides background on child sex tourism and efforts to combat it worldwide. Part III discusses whether the exercise of
U.S. criminal jurisdiction over child sex tourists comports with general principles of international law. Part IV
investigates possible bases for jurisdiction over child sex tourists from the standpoint of U.S. domestic law, including
the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Part V discusses the proper basis of congressional power for section
2423(c) and considers the propriety of exercising jurisdiction over Michael Lewis Clark, the first person charged with
violating section 2423(c). The paper concludes that, on balance, while the Commerce Clause does not grant Congress
sufficient authority upon which to base jurisdiction over U.S. child sex tourists under section 2423(c), an international
treaty, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution
and Child Pornography, does.

II. Background

A. Michael Lewis Clark

Military veteran Michael Lewis Clark was indicted on September [*345] 25, 2003, under a then-new federal statute,
18 U.S.C. 2423(c), that makes it a crime for a U.S. national to travel abroad and engage in sex with a child. n2 Section
2423(c) provides that "Any United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence who travels in foreign
commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 30 years, or both." According to the complaint a U.S. prosecutor filed against him, Cambodian authorities
arrested Clark on June 28, 2003, for "debauchery involving illicit sexual conduct" with two minors. n3 Two weeks later,
Cambodian authorities formally notified the U.S. Customs attache in Bangkok, Thailand, of Clark's arrest. n4 The next
week, U.S. agents, with the assistance of Action Pour Les Enfants, or Action for the Children, a nongovernmental
organization that works to prevent sexual exploitation of children, investigated Clark's alleged misconduct and
interviewed the alleged victims. n5 Two days later, U.S. agents interrogated Clark while he was in Cambodian custody.
Clark reportedly confessed that not only had he committed the specific incident that led to his arrest, but that he had
also been a pedophile for the last half-dozen years and had molested between forty and fifty children in that time. n7

Three weeks later, on August 13, a U.S. prosecutor filed a formal complaint against Clark in U.S. district court in
Seattle. n8 Cambodian authorities dropped their charges against Clark n9 and expelled him from [*346] the country.
Clark's arrest came after years of investigation by authorities in several different countries. According to the
complaint filed against him, Australian authorities became aware of Clark's sexual activities in about 2000. n14
Members of various U.S. agencies in Thailand and Cambodia, Cambodian and Australian police, and Action Pour Les
Enfants were all involved in the investigation of Clark after his initial arrest. n15

Clark's arrest was part of Operation Predator, a law enforcement initiative that combats sex crimes from several
different angles. n16 Operation Predator is a project of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, now part of the
newly-created Department of Homeland Security. n17 In addition to sex tourists, Operation Predator has targeted
internet predators and child pornographers, resulting in the deportation of several foreign nationals convicted of sex
offenses involving children. n18

On March 27, 2004, Clark agreed to plead guilty to the charges [*347] against him. n19 Under the terms of his
plea agreement, however, Clark retained the right to seek dismissal under "Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) and (3) based on
constitutional, jurisdictional and statutory construction grounds only and . . . appeal any adverse rulings." n20 Clark
indeed sought dismissal of the charges against him on such grounds. n21

Approximately one month later, the district court ruled in a published decision that there were no grounds for
dismissal of the charges against Clark because section 2423(c) represented a valid exercise of Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause. n22 This decision acknowledged the limitations of the federalism-driven U.S. Supreme Court
decisions of United States v. Lopez n23 and United States v. Morrison, n24 but stated that since federalism was not a
concern in Clark's situation, Congress's Commerce Clause power in this area was (at least) nearly unlimited. n25 The
district court stated that section 2423(c) regulated "use of channels of commerce," which, under the broad test of the
U.S. Supreme Court decision Perez v. United States, was permissible. n26 The district court also relied on United States
v. Cummings, n27 a Ninth Circuit decision upholding the extraterritorial reach of the International Parental Kidnapping
Crime Act, to justify an extremely broad Commerce Clause power. n28 The district court additionally determined that
both the nationality and universality principles justified jurisdiction over Clark. n29

B. Child Sex Tourism

Child sex tourism is an international phenomenon involving pedophiles traveling from countries where their conduct is
more strictly punished - called "sending countries" - to countries where it is easier for them to escape prosecution -
"destination countries." n30 [*348] Typical destination countries in Asia include Thailand, the Philippines, Sri Lanka,
and Taiwan. n31 The Czech Republic is rapidly becoming a major destination country in Europe. n32 Honduras was the
destination country in a recent, publicized U.S. case. n33 Many commentators consider the United States, Japan,
Australia, and many western European nations typical sending countries. n34

In a 2000 story on child sex tourism, CNN reported "at least 23 countries have adopted laws allowing prosecution
of their citizens at home for sex offenses with children overseas." n35 For example, in 1994, Australia made it a crime
for its nationals to have sex abroad with children under sixteen. n36 Australia has convicted its nationals for both
engaging in and arranging child sex abroad. n37 In a rare exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, Canada passed similar
legislation in 1997. n38 [*349] France's penal code applies to all felonies committed by French nationals
extraterritorially n39 and prohibits the use of child prostitutes by French nationals anywhere. n40 In 1999, an addition to
Japan's penal code forbade its nationals to hire prostitutes younger than eighteen, domestically or extraterritorially. n41
Within three months of the law taking effect, the head of the international criminal affairs division of Japan's National
Police Agency reported that twenty arrests had been made under the new law. n42

C. History of the Statute

Section 2423(c), the U.S. statute under which Clark was charged, is a descendant of the Mann Act of 1910. n43 Also
known as the White-Slave Traffic Act, this 1910 law prohibited the interstate or foreign transportation of "any woman
or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose . . . ." n44 Congress amended the
Mann Act in 1986 so that it forbade the interstate or foreign transport of male as well as female persons under eighteen
with the intent to involve the minor in sexual activity. n45 In 1994, Congress added subsection 2423(b), which made it a
crime to transport oneself across state or national borders with the intent to have sex with a minor. n46

According to congressional reports, however, there was concern that cases could arise in which it would be difficult
to prove the intent required for a prosecution under section 2423(b). n47 One commentator [*350] criticized section
2423(b) because those who travel for reasons other than sex with children would be "virtually immune from
prosecution" if such travelers decided to hire a child prostitute while abroad. n48 Thus, in the PROTECT Act of 2003,
n49 Congress added section 2423(c), which prohibited merely traveling in foreign commerce and engaging in sex with a
minor. n50 In a November 2004 press release, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement reported that while
in the decade prior to the PROTECT Act, U.S. authorities made only three "child sex tourism arrests," since the Act's
passage, the Bureau had made ten such arrests. n51

While the difference between sections 2423(b) and 2423(c) may seem slight, it raises issues of jurisdiction that
courts previously had not had to consider. Under section 2423(c) it is now quite possible for courts to exercise
jurisdiction when a major part of the crime - the prohibited sexual act - takes place outside of the United States. As a
practical matter, however, it seems reasonable to assume that many persons who violate the new section 2423(c) will
also violate the old section 2423(b).
Section 2423(c) nonetheless represents a significant increase in regulation of foreign activity by Congress. Congressional debates, however, did not touch on this expansion of jurisdiction; the proposed amendment received little, if varied, recorded attention. Speaking in support of the measure, Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., (R-Wis.) focused on the condition of prostitutes involved in sex tourism, who, he reported, are kidnapped and "then forced into prostitution." Representative Nancy L. Johnson (R-Conn.) instead focused on the conduct of sex tourists once they return to the United States. They "do not only act on their predatory impulses overseas," she claimed, but "return to the United States emboldened by their [experience]." Most of the debate focused on other provisions of the PROTECT Act, such as a nationwide Amber Alert system and a prohibition on virtual child pornography.

III. Jurisdiction under International Law

In a case involving application of U.S. law to foreign flag vessels, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed in 1963 Chief Justice John Marshall's 1804 statement that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." The Court has made no further definitive pronouncements on the overall relationship between congressional power and international law in the modern era, and federal appellate courts have taken varying approaches.

The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, published in 1987, recognized six main principles justifying a state's exercise of jurisdiction: territorial (conduct, persons, or things within the state's territory), effects (conduct outside the state's "territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory"), protective ("offenses directed against the security of the state or other offenses threatening the integrity of governmental functions"), nationality (actor is a national of the state), passive personality (victim of a crime is a national of the state), and universality ("offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism"). According to the Restatement, "territoriality is considered the normal, and nationality an exceptional, basis for the exercise of jurisdiction." Furthermore, there may be situations in which the nationality of an actor is by itself insufficient to make it "reasonable" (to use the Restatement's limiting term) for the state of nationality to exercise criminal jurisdiction.

Since the early 1900s, the Supreme Court has taken a dim view toward the exercise of U.S. criminal jurisdiction over U.S. nationals abroad based solely on their citizenship. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., pronounced in 1909 that the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done. . . . For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent. Other principles of jurisdiction, however, were apparently acceptable. Chief Justice William Howard Taft, writing for a unanimous Court in 1922, allowed the prosecution of U.S. nationals who had defrauded the United States in a Brazilian port. His opinion considered the interest of the Brazilian government in the matter, stating "it is no offense to the dignity or right of sovereignty of Brazil to hold" the defendants "for this crime against the government to which they owe allegiance." This would comport with the Restatement's effects and protective principles. For several decades before World War II, there was a U.S. District Court for China, created by Congress under the power given to it by several treaties with China that exercised jurisdiction over all U.S. citizens operating within China. At the time the Restatement was published, the United States "only sparingly applied law," other than tax law, "to individuals residing abroad on the basis of their United States nationality," More recently, however, the United States has, in the words of one commentator, "been on the cutting edge of states pressing to extend coverage of domestic laws beyond
A 2002 Ninth Circuit decision based extraterritorial jurisdiction for sex crimes on principles other than nationality. In United States v. Neil, the court upheld the conviction of an alien who had molested a U.S. minor in Mexican territorial waters on a ship of Panamanian registry. The ship had been on a round trip from California to several Mexican ports. The court was required to consult international law because the statute on which prosecutors relied limited its reach "to the extent permitted by international law." The court held that both the effects and passive personality principles supported jurisdiction.

It should be noted, though, that the Restatement generally does not control decision-making in the federal courts. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, in a 1996 opinion in United States v. Yousef, exercised jurisdiction over the defendants on the ground that such exercise conformed to principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction found in the Restatement. In a stern rebuke on review, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stressed that customary international law does not restrict Congress. The Second Circuit stated that the proper justification for jurisdiction was a multilateral treaty concerning civil aviation, not the Restatement.

It is the Ninth, and not the Second, Circuit that will handle any appeals in Clark's case. The Ninth Circuit uses a two-pronged test for deciding whether to give a statute extraterritorial application: first, the text of the statute must indicate that Congress intended extraterritorial application; and second, extraterritorial application must "comply with principles of international law." The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the nationality principle allows extraterritorial application of national statutes, though it has not mentioned the historically narrow use of this power.

IV. Jurisdiction under U.S. Law

Whether jurisdiction over Clark is proper under U.S. law is a less straightforward matter, one that requires analysis of the U.S. Constitution, case law, and treaties, as well as analysis of the intersection of these with international law. Since the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed in its 1995 opinion in United States v. Lopez that the "Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers," there must be an identifiable constitutional source which grants Congress the power to pass section 2423(c). Specifically, the Commerce, Offenses, Supremacy, and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography are relevant to the determination of criminal jurisdiction over Clark.

A. Commerce Clause Limitations

1. Supreme Court Jurisprudence

The Commerce Clause of the Constitution gives Congress the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." The Supreme Court has held this clause also gives Congress the power to regulate "use of the channels of interstate commerce." The Court in its 1917 opinion in Caminetti v. United States held that the Mann Act was a proper use of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, stating:

It may be conceded, for the purpose of the argument, that Congress has no power to punish one who travels in interstate commerce merely because he has the intention of committing an illegal or immoral act at the conclusion of the journey. But this act is not concerned with such instances. It seeks to reach and punish the movement in interstate commerce of women and girls with a view to the accomplishment of the unlawful purposes prohibited.

In the 1999 case of Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, the Court proclaimed that Congress's power to regulate
foreign commerce is greater than its power to regulate interstate commerce; n81 accordingly, lower courts have approved foreign commerce regulation that is similar to permissible interstate commerce regulation without in-depth analysis. n82

More recently, the Supreme Court has proved reluctant to give Congress broad authority to base penal statutes on the Commerce Clause. n83 In the 1995 case of United States v. Lopez, the Court denied Congress the power to regulate guns in school zones, ruling that the connection between guns at school and commerce did not justify congressional regulation. n84 Five years later, in United States v. Morrison, the Court stated, "Even under our modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress's regulatory authority is not without effective bounds." n85 In 2002, the Court, in Ring v. Arizona, cited Lopez for the proposition that a criminal statute enacted under the Commerce Clause may "require the addition of an element" relating to commerce to ensure the statute is not impermissibly broad. n86

2. Lower Court Jurisprudence

At first glance, United States v. Thomas, n87 decided by the Ninth Circuit in 1990, appears factually similar to Clark's case. The defendant in Thomas took photographs of himself and an underage girl engaging in sexual acts, then mailed the film from California to Maryland for development. n88 A U.S. prosecutor charged him with violating 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), n89 which forbids producing child pornography that will then have some tie to interstate or foreign commerce. n90 At trial, prosecutors successfully maintained that the mailing established a sufficient tie to interstate commerce after the pictures were made; the Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal. n91

One of the few decisions discussing a challenge to extraterritorial jurisdiction under section 2423(b) is the 2002 opinion of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas in United States v. Bredimus. n92 Local police in Thailand had arrested the defendant. n93 Upon his return to the United States, U.S. prosecutors charged him with violating section 2423(b). n94 The defendant asserted that section 2423(b) was unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress had exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause by prohibiting the transport of oneself, and that Congress could not regulate conduct occurring in another country. n95 The government claimed both that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to prosecute him and that the government had "authority to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over sex tourists." n96

The district court did not reach the issue of applying section 2423(b) extraterritorially. Rather, it ruled that Congress had the power to prevent immoral uses of the channels of interstate commerce, that Congress's authority to regulate foreign commerce was greater than its authority to regulate interstate commerce, and that there was no fundamental right to travel for illicit purposes. n97 The court found it unnecessary to decide whether Congress had the power to proscribe conduct occurring in a foreign country, explaining that the defendant's violation of section 2423(b) was complete as soon as he left the United States and traveled "to a foreign country for the purpose of engaging in unlawful sexual activity with a juvenile." n98 The court further stated that illicit sexual activity did not have to be "the sole purpose of the foreign travel;" rather, "the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a dominant motive . . . was to engage in a sexual act with a juvenile." n99 Jurisdiction thus was sustained.

The defendant in Bredimus was also charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 2251A(b)(2)(A) and (c)(1). n100 At the time, that section read:

(b) Whoever purchases or otherwise obtains custody or control of a minor, or offers to purchase or otherwise obtain custody or control of a minor either -

(1) with knowledge that, as a consequence of the purchase or obtaining of custody, the minor will be portrayed in a visual depiction engaging in, or assisting another person to engage in, sexually explicit conduct; or
(2) with intent to promote either -

(A) the engaging in of sexually explicit conduct by such minor for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct; or

(B) the rendering of assistance by the minor to any other person to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct;

shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 20 years or for life and by a fine under this title, if any of the circumstances described in subsection (c) of this section exist.

(c) The circumstances referred to in subsections (a) and (b) are that -

(1) in the course of the conduct described in such subsections the minor or the actor traveled in or was transported in interstate or foreign commerce. n101

The defendant argued that since the alleged crime had occurred in Thailand, he could not be found guilty of violating section 2251A. n102 The district court, following Fifth Circuit precedent, ruled that "Congress has the authority to attach extraterritorial effect to its penal enactments," n103 and that "resolution of the jurisdictional issue in this case depends not on Congress's authority to pass the statute, but instead on whether Congress intended the statute to be applied extraterritorially." n104 After deciding that Congress had intended to give extraterritorial effect to section 2251A, the court in Bredimus considered whether the Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to punish the defendant. n105 The court ruled that, had the defendant not been arrested in Thailand, it was reasonable to expect that the pornographic tapes he had made would have found "their way into interstate and foreign commerce." n106 Thus, the court reasoned, the Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to apply section 2251A to the case at bar. n107

Another relevant Ninth Circuit case is United States v. Cummings, n108 which dealt with the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. 1204(a). Section 1204(a) criminalized the removal or retaining of a child "outside the United States with intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights." n109 The defendant in Cummings had moved two of his children to Germany via commercial airliner even though his former spouse had primary custody of the children. n110 The defendant asserted that the Commerce Clause did not give Congress the power to prohibit such conduct. n111 The Ninth Circuit upheld the statute against this challenge, holding that the defendant moving the children in foreign commerce, as well as unlawfully preventing them from returning to the United States via foreign commerce, were sufficient grounds for Congress to regulate the activity under the Commerce Clause. n112

B. Offenses Clause

Another possible basis for congressional authority for section 2423(c) is the Offenses Clause, which grants Congress the power "to define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations." n113 The U.S. Supreme Court, in its 1815 opinion in The Nereide, held binding "the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land." n114 In the 1887 case of United States v. Arjona, the Court upheld a statute forbidding the counterfeiting of foreign currency. n115 The court held that nation-states were obligated to protect each others' currencies, stating, "A right secured by the law of nations to a nation, or its people, is one the United States as the representatives of this nation are bound to protect." n116

Columbia Law Professor Louis Henkin has noted that the phrase "law of nations" in the Offenses Clause could have been interpreted to refer only to interactions between nation-states. n117 He claimed, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court has read the phrase more broadly to include crimes committed by individuals, and thus enabled Congress "to enforce by criminal penalties any new international obligations the United States might accept." n118

[*360] Potential sources of such "new international obligations" are the several declarations on the rights of children promulgated by international bodies in the twentieth century. The League of Nations, in 1924, adopted a
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which prohibited the exploitation of children. n119 In 1959, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a Declaration of the Rights of the Child. n120 This later Declaration stated that children should "be protected against all forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation," and should not be allowed to work in situations that would compromise health or moral development. n121

In 1989, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child ("Children's Convention"). n122 The United States has not ratified the Children's Convention, n123 and the Senate has indicated its unwillingness to do so. n124 There are presently 191 member states, including Cambodia, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, China, Saudi Arabia, the Congo, and Liberia; the Holy See is also a signatory. n125 Somalia is the only other nonparty state. n126 Cambodia, site of the alleged conduct in Clark, is a party to the Children's Convention. n127 Article 34 of the Children's Convention provides:

States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent:

(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in [*361] any unlawful sexual activity;
(b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices;
(c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials. n128

Article 35 requires member states to "take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form." n129 The Committee on the Rights of the Child has primary responsibility for monitoring compliance with the Convention, but the U.N. Children's Fund and nongovernmental organizations are also involved. n130

C. Treaty Powers

Treaty powers are another possible basis for Congress's power to pass section 2423(c). The Constitution's Supremacy Clause provides that treaties form part of "the supreme Law of the Land." n131 Chief Justice Marshall, in the 1829 case of Foster v. Neilson, affirmed this with a substantial qualification. "Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land," he wrote. "It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision." n132 Then he limited this proposition:

But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court. n133

In accordance with this pronouncement, the Restatement divides treaties into self-executing - those that do not need implementing legislation from Congress - and non-self-executing - those that do. n134

The United States and Cambodia have both joined the 2000 [*362] Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography. n135 The Protocol elaborates on certain aspects of the Children's Convention. A state party agrees to, among other things, "ensure that, as a minimum," specified acts "are fully covered under its criminal or penal law, whether such offences are committed domestically or transnationally." n136 These include "sexual exploitation of the child" and "offering, obtaining, procuring or providing a child for child prostitution." n137
D. Due Process Limitations

This paper only considers whether there are facial due process problems with asserting jurisdiction over Clark. That the application of the law may have defects specific to Clark's prosecution is beyond the scope of this paper. n138

1. Approach of the Ninth Circuit

The Ninth Circuit, where Clark has been charged, is more willing to interpret due process with an eye to principles of international law than are the other circuits that have published opinions in this area. The best illustration of this difference involves prosecutions under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, n139 which forbids the distribution or possession, with intent to distribute, of controlled substances "on board a vessel of the United States, or on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." n140 Such legislation is within Congress's power under the Piracies and Felonies Clause. n141

The leading case in the Ninth Circuit for how due process applies when the United States asserts jurisdiction extraterritorially is from 1990, United States v. Davis. n142 In Davis, the Ninth Circuit held, "International law principles, standing on their own, do not create substantive rights or affirmative defenses for litigants in United States courts." n143 The court, however, did not end its inquiry there, going on to state:

International law principles may be useful as a rough guide of whether a sufficient nexus exists between the defendant and the United States so that application of the statute in question would not violate due process. However, danger exists that emphasis on international law principles will cause us to lose sight of the ultimate question: would application of the statute to the defendant be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair? n144

The court found a sufficient nexus in that the defendant, although not a U.S. citizen, was sailing toward San Francisco with a cargo of marijuana. n145

Decisions subsequent to Davis have reaffirmed that due process considerations are influenced, but not completely controlled, by international law. In its 1992 opinion of United States v. Juda, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed for lack of jurisdiction charges against a foreign crewman of a boat carrying sixteen tons of hashish from Australia to Canada. n146 The district court based the dismissal on the absence of any nexus to the United States. n147 The Ninth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the vessel was stateless and that to deny jurisdiction would be to allow "floating sanctuaries" not subject to any state's control. n148 More recent Ninth Circuit opinions have followed Davis. n149

2. Approaches of Other Circuits

In contrast, other circuits have rejected that either international law or due process impose a nexus requirement when asserting jurisdiction over defendants charged under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act. n150 The Third Circuit took an extreme position in the 2002 opinion of United States v. Perez-Oviedo, holding that the Act "expresses the necessary congressional intent to override international law." n151

In other contexts, the Second Circuit has only partially adopted the rationale of Davis. In the 2003 opinion of United States v. Yousef, the court aligned itself with the Third Circuit by placing Congress above the constraints of international law. n152 The Second Circuit promoted a policy of great deference to the other branches in international affairs, holding that "while customary international law may inform the judgment of our courts in an appropriate case, it cannot alter or constrain the making of law by the political branches of the government as ordained by the Constitution." n153 The court in Yousef quoted Davis for the notion that "in order to apply extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process, there must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United
States, so that such application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair," but did not explicitly refer to [*365] international law in its due process analysis. n154 The court engaged in extensive analysis of international law in other parts of the decision, however. For example, it held that the protective principle but not the universality principle of international law made jurisdiction over the defendants proper. n155

V. The Proper Basis of Congressional Power for Section 2423(c)

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington used the Commerce Clause to justify the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over Clark, n156 ruling that both the nationality and universality principles allowed jurisdiction over Clark. n157 The district court was correct that exercise of criminal jurisdiction over Clark comports with international law. The Commerce Clause, though, does not justify section 2423(c). Although section 2423(c) uses language similar to other exercises of Congress's Commerce Clause powers, it is not a proper use of those powers. Section 2423(c) should instead be seen as implementing legislation for the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.

A. International Law

While the United States may not rely on the nationality principle as much as other countries do, to do so in Clark's case violates no international law principles. Other countries have punished conduct similar to Clark's solely on the basis of the nationality of the offender. n158 As a matter of international law, therefore, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over Clark is proper.

B. Commerce Clause

Prior Commerce Clause decisions do not indicate that section 2423(c) is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power.

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1. Thomas Provides No Support for Jurisdiction

United States v. Thomas, decided by the Ninth Circuit in 1990, involved a situation rather different from Clark's. Unlike the defendant in Thomas, Clark is not alleged to have been in a position to import contraband into the United States. Nor does Clark's conduct have any ties to the United States, other than that Clark is a U.S. citizen and traveled from the United States to Cambodia on a U.S. military aircraft. The conduct with which Clark is charged cannot have had much effect on commerce.

Furthermore, the reasoning of Thomas is flawed and should not be used to justify jurisdiction over Clark. On appeal, the defendant in Thomas claimed that section 2251(a) could not be applied to him because he had made the pictures in Mexico. n159 If that was true, and Thomas's victim never left Mexico, his abuse of her is arguably beyond the reach of the statute. The statute forbids only the domestic use of a minor, and the interstate or foreign transport of a minor, for the purpose of creating pornography. n160

If Congress had intended section 2251(a) to have extraterritorial reach, the prohibition on interstate or foreign transport in section 2251(c) would be superfluous - any transport whatsoever would be an attempt or conspiracy to violate section 2251(a), punishable by the same penalties as the completed crime. n161 The legislative history contains no evidence that Congress intended extraterritorial application; congressional findings associated with the most recent revision of section 2251 before Thomas's arrest reported that "child exploitation has become a multi-million dollar industry" involving "a nationwide," not global, "network of individuals openly advertising their desire to exploit children." n162 The Thomas panel thus had misread section 2251(a) when it stated that
in this case, Congress has created a comprehensive statutory scheme to eradicate sexual exploitation of children. As part of that scheme, Congress has proscribed the transportation, mailing, and receipt of child pornography. Punishing the creation of child pornography outside the United States that is actually, is intended to be, [*367] or may reasonably be expected to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce is an important enforcement tool. We, therefore, believe it likely that under section 2251(a) Congress intended to reach extraterritorial acts that otherwise satisfy the statutory elements. n163

The phrasing of section 2251(a) indicates Congress may have been concerned with jurisdictional overreaching; the district court in Thomas was willing to give the statute more reach than Congress had sought. n164

It is not clear from the published opinion if the defendant substantiated his claim that the pornography had been produced in Mexico. The Ninth Circuit framed the defendant's contention as one that the prosecution failed "to introduce any evidence . . . that Thomas shot the pictures . . . in the United States." n165 The panel may have been influenced by a belief Thomas had not actually gone to Mexico to take the pictures; there is no discussion of any evidence of where the pictures were made. For a variety of reasons, therefore, Thomas provides scant support for jurisdiction over Clark.

2. Bredimus Provides No Support for Jurisdiction

The court in Clark's case will not be able to duck jurisdictional issues, as the court in Bredimus did, by considering the defendant's crime to have been completed at the border of the United States. In contrast to the facts in Bredimus, Clark's violation of section 2423(c) took place outside the United States. Section 2423(c) does not [*368] criminalize the act of traveling with intent, but rather the act of engaging in sex itself. Although it is alleged that Clark has admitted to enough to also convict him of violating section 2423(b), he was not charged under that subsection. n166 One could infer from this that the U.S. Attorney's Office deliberately used this as a case to test the validity of section 2423(c)'s jurisdictional reach.

The portion of Bredimus that dealt with section 2251A offers little support for exercising criminal jurisdiction over Clark. Clark's alleged acts of abuse produced no tangible item that, in the words of the court in Bredimus, "could be reasonably expected to find their way into interstate and foreign commerce." n167

3. Cummings Provides No Support for Jurisdiction

The Ninth Circuit panel that decided Cummings upheld jurisdiction over the defendant in that case because he used foreign commerce to transport his children to Germany and unlawfully prevented them from re-entering foreign commerce to return to the United States. Clark's conduct is much more tenuously connected to foreign commerce. There is no evidence his victims ever traveled in foreign commerce; they do not appear to have even come to the United States for Clark's prosecution. The district court in Clark acknowledged that it was allowing a broader jurisdictional reach than that found in Cummings (as well as Bredimus and Thomas), but justified this with an assertion that prior cases did not mark out the maximum boundaries of permissible jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause. This assertion overlooks the statement of the U.S. Supreme Court in Morrison that congressional authority under the Commerce Clause "is not without effective bounds." n168

4. Commerce Clause Power Should Be Limited Beyond Concern for Federalism

The attempt of the district court in Clark to distinguish section 2423(c) from the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison by focusing on the fact that section 2423(c) does not impinge upon the power of states is misguided. It is true that the federal government punishing U.S. citizens for sexually abusing children abroad does not interfere with state power, but as the Court reiterated in Morrison, "the [*369] powers of the legislature are defined and limited." n169 The absence of
concern for principles of federalism does not imply the presence of a provision in the U.S. Constitution granting Congress power to regulate.

If Congress is allowed to regulate the conduct of anyone who "travels in foreign commerce," as in section 2423(c), Congress's reach will be greatly expanded beyond the traditional bounds of federal law. The only U.S. nationals unreachable by such a formula would be domestic residents who have never crossed a state or national boundary and foreign-born U.S. citizens who never leave the countries of their births. The connection between acts prohibited by section 2423(c) and foreign commerce is attenuated. The Court in Lopez disallowed regulation under the Commerce Clause of guns in school zones as insufficiently connected to any "economic activity." If there are any meaningful limitations on Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, section 2423(c) does not constitute a permissible use of the Commerce Clause.

Questions of reach of congressional power aside, since Clark traveled on a U.S. military transport plane to get to Asia, it may be questioned whether he even traveled in foreign commerce at all. This is unlike the situation in Cummings, which involved commercial air travel. The district court in Clark essentially read "foreign commerce" as "foreign travel." If the Commerce Clause does give Congress the ability to regulate all foreign travel, this would cover not only Clark's travel, but also a wide variety of other situations, such as a U.S. citizen swimming across the English Channel, or the transport of enemy combatants from Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

C. Offenses Clause

Both the United States and Somalia have signed the Children's Convention, though neither has ratified it. The United States has not objected to the treaty and has, by signing it, expressed approval. That 191 states have ratified the treaty, and that the other two U.N. member states have signed it, constitutes strong evidence that the Convention is customary international law. The Convention's proh-bition on any form of sexual abuse, including "the exploitive use of [*370] children in prostitution," would thus be customary international law. Congress would have the power under the Constitution's Offenses Clause to punish those who commit acts covered by the Convention.

In light of the Senate's opposition to the Convention, however, a U.S. court would be unlikely to consider it customary international law, considering the matter to be a political question. Since justification for section 2423(c) may be found elsewhere, a cautious court would not rely on the Children's Convention. The Offenses Clause is thus a possible but unlikely primary basis for jurisdiction over Clark.

D. Treaty Power

The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography provides the strongest authority for congressional power to criminalize child sex tourism abroad. A multilateral treaty to which the United States belongs, the Protocol obligates the United States to criminalize "sexual exploitation" of children by U.S. nationals anywhere in the world. Treaties are the supreme law of the land. The language of the Protocol seems to address the political branches, stating that "States Parties shall . . . take all appropriate . . . measures." This would make the Protocol non-self-executing. Section 2423(c) can be seen as fulfilling, or, rather, implementing, the United States' obligations under the Protocol. Section 2423(c) would thus be a proper exercise of Congress's power to pass implementing legislation. For this reason, jurisdiction over Clark should be considered proper.

E. Due Process Limitations

Whether or not international law is considered when determining what constitutes due process, there are no facial due process problems with a U.S. court exercising criminal jurisdiction over Clark. Under the typical approach in the Ninth Circuit, due process does require examination of international law before jurisdiction may be exerted extraterritorially.
That other states routinely punish their nationals for engaging in child sex tourism while abroad indicates that it would not be aberrant for the United States to do so as well.

Even using the approach of Thomas, there would be no due [*371] process defect. The court in Thomas did consider international law, but unlike other Ninth Circuit cases, did not link the analysis of international law to due process. n174 The court took the position that "Congress is not bound by international law in enacting statutes," n175 but went on to note that "international law permits a country to apply its statutes to extraterritorial acts of its nationals." n176 It is not clear from the opinion, however, that Thomas ever left the United States, so the court's discussion of international law is arguably dictum.

Given any likely construction of due process, no facial due process problems with exerting jurisdiction over Clark exist.

VI. Conclusion

Jurisdiction over Clark is proper as a matter of international and U.S. domestic law. Specifically, the nationality principle of international law justifies the U.S. exerting jurisdiction over Clark for his activities in Cambodia. U.S. courts should reject the Commerce Clause as a basis for exercising jurisdiction under section 2423(c) and instead rely on a specific treaty, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children.

As the world becomes more interconnected, it will become increasingly more important for nations to ensure their nationals are well-behaved when abroad. The citizens of Clapham are now held to a higher standard of behavior when they journey to Martaban than they were in Kipling's day.

Legal Topics:

For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:

Criminal Law & Procedure
Criminal Offenses
Sex Crimes
Child Pornography
Penalties
Criminal Law & Procedure
Criminal Offenses
Sex Crimes
Pandering & Pimping
Elements
Criminal Law & Procedure
Criminal Offenses
Sex Crimes
Child Pornography
Elements

FOOTNOTES:


files/03 434M comp.pdf [hereinafter Clark Complaint].

n4. Id. P 4.

n5. Id. P 5.

n6. Id. P 6.

n7. Id. P 6-9.

n8. Id.


n15. Id. PP 1-6.


n20. Id. P 7.


n22. Id. at 1133-36.


n25. Clark, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1133-36.

n26. Id. at 1133-34 (internal quotation marks omitted).

n27. United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002).


n29. Id. at 1131.


n33. United States v. Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2002).

n34. See Kathy J. Steinman, Article, Sex Tourism and the Child: Latin America's and the United States' Failure to Prosecute Sex Tourists, 13 Hastings Women's L.J. 53, 60 (2002); Edelson, supra note 30, at 485; Eric Thomas Berkman, Note, Responses to the International Child Sex Tourism Trade, 19 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 397, 397 (1996); Healy, supra note 30, at 1864-67.


n36. Crimes (Child Sex Tourism) Amendment Act (1994) (Austl.) (amending Crimes Act (1914)).


n40. Id. art. 225-12-1.

n42. Doug Struck, Japan tries to squash child-sex industry, Seattle Times, Feb. 11, 2000, available at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=4004303&date=20000211


n44. Id.


n48. See Edelson, supra note 30, at 537.


n50. 18 U.S.C. 2423(c) (2005) ("Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. Any United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence who travels in foreign commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.").


n53. Id. at 2405-06 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).

n54. Id. at 2414 (statement of Rep. Johnson).


n56. See id. at 2432-36 (statements of Reps. Sensenbrenner, Scott, Smith, Pomeroy, Green, Hart).

n57. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (quoting Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).


n59. Id. 402 cmt. b.

n60. See id.
n61. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (citing Phillips v. Eyre, L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, 28 (1870); Albert Venn Dicey, Conflict of Laws 647 (2d ed. 1908)).


n63. Id.

n64. See Restatement (Third) 402(1)(c), (3).

n65. See An act creating a United States court for China and prescribing the jurisdiction thereof, 59 P.L. 403, 34 Stat. 814 (1906) (repealed 1948); see, e.g., Smith v. American Asiatic Underwriters, 127 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1942).

n66. Restatement (Third) 402 n.1.


n68. United States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2002).

n69. Id. at 420.

n70. Id. at 422; see 18 U.S.C. 2244 (2000) (punishing sex with a minor "in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States"); 18 U.S.C. 7(8) (2000) (defining "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" to include, "to the extent permitted by international law, any foreign vessel during a voyage having a scheduled departure from or arrival in the United States with respect to an offense
committed by or against a national of the United States.

n71. Neil, 312 F.3d at 422.


n73. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2003).


n75. United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1991).

n76. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 740 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1990)).


n78. U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 3.

n79. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.

n80. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917); see U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 3.

n82. See, e.g., United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Bredimus, 234 F. Supp. 2d 639, 643-44 (N.D. Tex. 2002).

n83. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565 (noting that if overly tenuous connections to commerce could justify legislation under the Commerce Clause, the Court would be "hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.").

n84. Id. at 558-59.


n86. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606 (2002) ("suggesting that addition to federal gun possession statute of "express jurisdictional element" requiring connection between weapon and interstate commerce would render statute constitutional under Commerce Clause." (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-562)).

n87. United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1990).

n88. Id. at 1067-68.

n89. Id. at 1068.

n90. 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) then provided, in full:
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.

The subsection was last amended in 1990. 18 U.S.C.A. 2251(a) (West Supp. 2004).

n91. Thomas, 893 F.2d at 1067.


n93. Id. at 641.

n94. Id.; 18 U.S.C. 2423(b) (1990):

Travel with intent to engage in sexual act with a juvenile. A person who travels in interstate commerce, or conspires to do so, or a United States citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States who travels in foreign commerce, or conspires to do so, for the purpose of engaging in any sexual act (as defined in section 2245) with a person under 18 years of age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

n95. Bredimus, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 641-42.

n96. Id. at 642.
n97. Id. at 644.

n98. Id.

n99. Id. at 646 (emphasis in original).

n100. Id. at 647.


n102. Bredimus, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 647.

n103. Id. at 647 (citing United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1977)).

n104. Id. (citing Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282-83 (1952); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Baker, 609 F.2d at 136).

n105. Id. at 649.

n106. Id. at 650.

n107. Id.
n108. United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2002).


n110. Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1047-48.

n111. Id. at 1148.

n112. Id. at 1148-51.

n113. U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 10.

n114. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).


n116. Id. at 487.


n118. Id. at 69-70.


n121. Id. princ. 9.


n124. See 148 Cong. Rec. S5717-18 (giving advice and consent to become a party to two optional protocols to the Children’s Convention but stating that by doing so "the United States assumes no obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child").

n125. See Ratifications Memorandum, supra note 123, at 2-12.

n126. Id. at 10.

n127. Id. at 3.

n128. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 122, art. 34.

n129. Id. art. 35.
n130. Id. arts. 43-45.

n131. U.S. Const. art. VI, 1, cl. 2.


n133. Id.

n134. Restatement (Third), supra note 58, 111(3), (4).


n137. Id.

n138. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement reported that it has arrested ten child sex tourists since the PROTECT Act took effect. Of these, Clark and seven others have both been accused of molesting boys, not girls. See Press Release, supra note 51; Bob Egelko, Ex-Peace Corpsman hit with sex charges, S.F. Chron., June 26, 2004, at B4, available at 2004 WL 58601021; Eric Lichtblau & James Dao, U.S.


n141. U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 10 (giving Congress the power "To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the High Seas"); United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1990).

n142. Davis, 905 F.2d at 248.

n143. Id. (quoting United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, slip. op. at 304 (9th Cir. 1990)).

n144. Id. at 248-49 & n.2 (internal citations omitted).

n145. Id. at 247-49.


n147. Id. at 777-80.

n148. United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382 (11th Cir. 1982)).
n149. See United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998).


n152. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied 124 S. Ct. 353 (2003) ("Congress is not bound by international law. If it chooses to do so, it may legislate with respect to conduct outside the United States, in excess of the limits posed by international law." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

n153. Id. at 92.

n154. Id. at 111 (quoting United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990)).

n155. Id. at 103-10.


n157. Id. at 1131.

n158. See, e.g., supra notes 37 and 42.
n159. United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1990).

n160. See supra note 90, with full text of 2251(a).

n161. See 18 U.S.C. 2251(e) (2003) ("Any individual who violates, or attempts or conspires to violate, this section shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 15 years nor more than 30 years.").


n163. Thomas, 893 F.2d at 1068-69 (citation and footnote omitted).

n164. Another district court subsequently found that section 2251(a) indeed exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause in another setting. See United States v. Matthews, 300 F. Supp. 2d. 1220, 1232 (2003). The defendant in Matthews used a video camera, which had been shipped in interstate commerce, to film himself having sex with a minor. Id. at 1222. Both the defendant and the minor resided in Alabama, and the video tape of the incident did not move in interstate commerce afterwards. Id. at 1222, 1232. The court ruled that section 2251(a) was unconstitutional as applied to simple intra-state production and possession of images of child pornography, or visual depictions of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, when such images and visual depictions were not mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, nor intended for interstate distribution or economic activity of any kind, including exchange of the pornographic recording for other prohibited material.

Id. at 1237 (emphasis in original).

n165. Id. at 1068.
n166. Clark Complaint, supra note 3, PP 6, 8-9; Plea Agreement, supra note 19.


n169. Id. at 616 n.7 (2000) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)).

n170. Id. at 559-68.

n171. Ratifications Memorandum, supra note 123, at 10-11.

n172. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 122, art. 34(b).

n173. Optional Protocol, supra note 136, art. 3.

n174. United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1990).

n175. Id. (citing United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 1983)).

n176. Id. (citing United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851 (9th Cir. 1976); Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 30(1)(a) (1965)).