Introduction

The British Navy delivered eight suspected Somali pirates to Kenyan authorities to stand trial in November 2008. n1 In a humid Mombasa courtroom, the prosecutor described the defendants' attack on a Danish fishing boat and the subsequent seizure of AK-47s and grenades - tools of the trade for pirates plying one of the globe's busiest shipping routes. n2 Defense attorney Jared Magolo denied the government's allegations and accused Kenyan prison officials of effectively torturing his clients by refusing to provide them clothing or remove their shackles while in custody. n3
Presiding Judge Catherine Mwangi mocked the suggestion from [*194] the bench, "Oh, I can see they're really bleeding, eh?" n4

In the Gulf of Aden, an area bounded by the Somali and Yemeni coastlines, pirates routinely seize the world's largest ships and hold them for ransom. n5 The actions of pirates threaten not only maritime shipping, n6 but also the delivery of vital humanitarian aid to refugees and internally displaced persons. n7 Without doubt, pirates must answer for their actions. Yet, as the account of the Kenyan trial above illustrates, the international community must examine a difficult and important question: In pursuing justice, what humanitarian protections, if any, are pirates due?

The status of pirates within human rights regimes is disputed. Indeed, some scholars argue prevailing human rights accords specifically exclude pirates, as a class, from protection. n8 The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("UNCAT") stands out among these treaties. n9 Embodying an international condemnation of torture and an inalienable human right to be free from its harmful effects, the application of UNCAT is broad. n10 Without exception, UNCAT seeks to prevent both the use of torture and the extradition, or refoulement, of individuals to states where torture is likely to occur. n11 As a state party to UNCAT, the United States pledges to "provide that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." n12 Yet, under a memorandum of understanding with the Kenyan government ("MOU"), n13 the United States may transfer [*195] suspected pirates to Kenya for trial and incarceration, where torture in prisons is well-documented. n14

This essay examines whether the United States' obligations under UNCAT may preclude its practice of extraditing suspected pirates to Kenya pursuant to a MOU. Part I describes the phenomenon of modern piracy, discusses challenges associated with domestic piracy trials, and "off-shoring" prosecution agreements with Kenya. Part II compares the indeterminate application of existing human rights regimes to pirates to the broad application of UNCAT protections. Part III discusses the United States' obligations under UNCAT, in particular, the non-refoulement provision found in Article 3. Part IV discusses whether UNCAT protections apply extraterritorially to suspected pirates held by the United States in international waters, finding support for this proposition in the treaty's language, customary international law, and international case law. Part V analyzes American obligations under UNCAT in light of human rights abuses in Kenyan prisons. Part VI concludes that the United States' obligations under UNCAT preclude the extradition of pirates to states like Kenya where it is more likely than not that they will face torture.

I. Modern Piracy Meets the International Human Rights Regime

Following the hijacking of the American tanker ship Maersk Alabama in April 2009, n15 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton detailed the impact of piracy on American foreign policy noting, "Pirates are criminals. They are armed gangs on the sea. And those plotting attacks must be stopped ... and brought to justice." n16 Secretary Clinton's sentiments reflect a growing concern that piracy in the Gulf of Aden will cripple the shipping industry and facilitate global terrorism. n17 Despite the deployment of a multi-[*196] national naval armada, incidents of piracy continue to increase. n18 Further, the international community has struggled to implement an effective legal response to this resurgent piracy that costs the shipping industry billions of dollars in losses while endangering the lives of mariners. n19

Two weeks after the Maersk Alabama incident, the first domestic prosecution of a suspected pirate in over a century began in the United States. n20 In May 2009, Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse was charged in the Southern District of New York for crimes of piracy in connection with the attack on the Maersk Alabama. n21 Prosecutors charged him under U.S. law criminalizing piracy under the law of nations, intentional seizure of a ship, violence aboard a ship, and hostage taking. n22 From the outset, the case was plagued with evidentiary hurdles, including testimony by Muse's father in Somalia that he was 15 years old at the time of the hijacking, a contention a magistrate judge ultimately rejected. n23 A year after proceedings commenced, Muse pled guilty to charges related to conspiracy and hostage taking, in exchange for prosecutors dropping more serious charges for hijacking. n24
The piracy trial of Muse may be an aberration. Upon capturing suspected pirates in the Gulf of Aden, many countries have been reluctant, or unwilling, to prosecute them. n25 Professor Yvonne Dutton notes "instead of bringing pirates to justice, a culture of impunity reigns, with captured pirates being released and permitted to continue their illegal activities." n26 [*197] Indeed, not only is "prosecuting pirates burdensome, entailing numerous logistical difficulties, it is also expensive and time-intensive[.]" n27 Other hurdles to domestic prosecution include "inadequate or non-existent national laws criminalizing acts committed, concerns about the safety and impartiality of local judges, the difficulties of obtaining and preserving evidence, and fears that if convicted, the pirates will be able to remain in the country where they are prosecuted." n28 Ultimately, the inclination to release pirates may lead to a situation in which "it is unlikely [pirates] will be deterred - particularly given the high rewards available to them in the form of escalating ransom payments." n29

The United States and other developed nations have pursued an alternative to domestic trials: "off-shoring" prosecution and incarceration of pirates to willing African partners. n30 Several states, notably Canada, Denmark, China, Britain, the European Union, and the United States, have memorialized agreements with Kenya conferring prosecutorial jurisdiction over suspected pirates captured in international waters by foreign military forces. n31 These agreements provide financial support for the prosecution of pirates. n32 Under the MOU with the United States, suspects extradited to Kenya have been tried and sentenced, while others wait in prisons for their day in court. n33 Kenyan authorities have given assurances that Somali detainees will be treated humanely and receive fair trials. n34

[*198] These agreements have won support as examples of international cooperation to combat piracy. n35 More recently, however, criticism from human rights groups, legal scholars, and the media has focused on the competence of Kenya's judiciary and human rights abuses committed in its prison system. n36 Extradition authorized by the agreements face increasing suspicion as well. Scholars have noted "the adjudicatory effectiveness of ... arrangements such as [these], however, can hinge on economic, judicial, legal and even political factors." n37 Importantly, the MOU with Kenya effectively authorizes "extraordinary rendition," generally defined as the transfer of an individual to another party to potentially negate constitutional protections afforded by the capturing state. n38 Although the Kenyan Constitution guarantees a speedy trial and prohibits torture and inhumane or degrading treatment, non-governmental organizations have begun pressing governments to review bilateral agreements citing "violations of the pirates' rights as guaranteed by the ... agreements with Kenya." n39 In light of increased preference for these agreements, author Michael Passman notes that, "because pirates will probably not be brought to the United States in large numbers to enjoy the rights guaranteed by the ... Constitution, the international law governing the treatment of captured pirates is all the more important." n40

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II. Ambiguous Human Rights Protections for Pirates and the Broad Sweep of UNCAT

Aboard a naval vessel in the seventeenth century, the fate of a captured pirate, considered an enemy of humanity, was often a painful affair. n41 Although international and domestic law called for trial-by-jury of pirates, detainees suspected of piracy were not afforded protection under the laws of war. n42 A captured pirate, "if caught in flagrante delicto, [was] summarily executed; he would normally be immediately hanged by the mast of the ship or drowned by the captor." n43 During the early nineteenth century, President Thomas Jefferson engaged in a military campaign against pirates, believing that "waging war, killing the Barbary pirates, and destroying their property was the best way to deter piratical attacks against American merchant ships[.]" n44 Modern nations face the more complicated prospect of charging pirates under outmoded laws, while simultaneously complying with expanded human rights regimes. n45 This struggle embodies an emerging realization that modern piracy is considerably more nuanced and complex [*200] than its storied predecessor.

International law calls for the suppression of all piratical acts, and confers universal jurisdiction on all states to prosecute pirates. n46 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas ("UNCLOS") requires all states to "cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas in any other place outside the
jurisdiction of any State." n47 The United States, not yet party to UNCLOS, has expressed its desire to ratify the treaty and has acted in conformity with its mandate with respect to suppression of piracy. n48 Unfortunately, while UNCLOS authorizes trials for all suspected pirates by supplying the necessary universal jurisdiction, it does not provide procedural guidelines for their prosecution. n49

Many international human rights agreements simply do not consider the unique status of pirates. Scholars have variously applied humanitarian protections to pirates, a task made difficult by the non-explicit nature of the treaty documents themselves. n50 Neither the Third nor Fourth Geneva Conventions, which proscribe protections owed to detainees during times of conflict, mention pirates. n51 Several foundational humanitarian protection documents explicitly single out pirates as a group of combatants who deserve no protection. n52 Michael Passman comments on the difficulty of applying treaties to pirates, noting:

The historical realities of piracy fly in the face of three fundamental assumptions that anchor the modern laws of war [providing humanitarian protections] . . . . First, pirates are the archetype of a nonstate war maker. Second, [*201] pirates are not always easily distinguishable from civilians until it is too late . . . . Third, like other nonstate actors, pirates often do not reciprocate lawful treatment. n53

Still others, like Professor Eugene Kontorovic, have stated that "pirates are at least presumptively civilians," deserving of certain minimal protections. n54 He notes, "while the Geneva Conventions do not necessarily apply to conflicts with pirates on the high seas, the minimal obligations of [the treaty] are widely thought to be generally applicable to all uses of military force as a matter of customary law." n55 As a result, except in situations of self-defense, "naval forces are prohibited from killing pirates and must instead seek to apprehend them." n56

In the absence of consensus regarding the applicability of human rights protections to pirates, UNCAT is notable for its per se application to all individuals, regardless of status. n57 In its preamble, the drafters of UNCAT note that the treaty's application, without exception, derives from the "inherent dignity of the human person." n58 To this end, "the nature of the activities in which the person concerned engaged cannot be a material consideration when making a determination under ... the Convention." n59

The prohibition against state-sanctioned torture was recognized widely before the adoption of UNCAT as a principle of customary international law. n60 Abuses of this prohibition led the drafters of UNCAT to create the structure for enforcement of a blanket international ban on torture. n61 To this end, UNCAT is built upon three foundational principles:

Article 1.

1. Torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person ... by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not [*202] include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

... 

Article 2.

1. Each State Party shall take ... measures to prevent torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.

2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever ... may be invoked as a justification of torture.
Article 3.

1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler"), or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. n62

The non-refoulement provision contained in Article 3 is distinguishable from analogous provisions in other human rights treaties because it is non-derogable. n63 UNCAT therefore confers two significant protections on captured pirates. First, State Parties may not torture suspected pirates. Second, State Parties may not extradite suspected pirates to territories where they are likely to face torture. The reach of these provisions take on special significance when considering the American obligations under UNCAT in conjunction with the operation of the Kenya-United States MOU.

III. American Obligations Under UNCAT

Determining the obligations of the United States under UNCAT must take place within an established interpretive methodology. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT") contains the general rules for interpreting obligations of State Parties to a treaty. n64 Article 31 states that treaties "shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose." n65 The interpretive context of a treaty includes agreements made at the signing, n66 subsequent agreements made between the parties, n67 subsequent practice in the application of the treaty, n68 and relevant international law. n69 In the event of ambiguity, or in the event that an interpretation leads to a "manifestly absurd or unreasonable" result, a State may consult supplementary means of interpretation. n70

Jurisdiction, in the context of treaties, concerns the extent of a State's obligation to regulate conduct, as enabled and limited by international law. n71 The many provisions conferring jurisdiction contained in UNCAT may give rise to ambiguity concerning its extraterritorial application. UNCAT contains no less than nine jurisdictional clauses n72 under a broad Article 2 mandate for State Parties to prevent torture in "any territory under its jurisdiction." n73 For example, Article 5 calls on each state party to establish jurisdiction over offenses criminalized by domestic torture laws, when offenses are committed "in any territory under its jurisdiction, or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State." n74 By contrast, Article 3 prohibitions of refoulement lack an analogous clause, and its affirmative "reach" is unspecified.

Interpretive sources referenced by VCLT are central to any discussion concerning the ambiguity of obligations of the United States pursuant to UNCAT Article 3. The following discussion of these obligations references reservations made at signing, supplemental discussions of jurisdiction, and subsequent State practice to demonstrate tension between the limited jurisdiction preferred by the United States, and a broader interpretation suggested by the text of the treaty, international case law, and customary international law.

By ratifying UNCAT on October 21, 1994, ten years after its adoption by the United Nations General Assembly, the United States became party to the non-refoulement provision embodied by Article 3 of the treaty. n75 However, in its Ratification Statement, the U.S. Senate adopted several reservations designed to limit and clarify the application of the treaty under American law. n76 The reservation to Article 3 speaks directly to the legality of extradition of suspected pirates to other states. In respect to UNCAT's non-refoulement provision, the United States "does not consider itself bound by Article 3 insofar as it conflicts with the obligations of the United States towards States not party to the Convention under bilateral extradition treaties with such States." n77 The meaning of this reservation is uncomplicated, precluding the reach of Article 3 to agreements with States not party to UNCAT. The Senate negotiation history also supports this view. n78 Kenya, however, is a state party to UNCAT. n79

It is notable that at ratification the United States interpreted the "substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of ... torture" language of Article 3 to mean "more likely than not" that torture will occur. n80 UNCAT does
not specify what constitutes "substantial grounds", thus leaving a determination to the state party. Consistent with
the non-refoulement provision of the Refugee Act of 1980, an individual may not be extradited to another state where
threat of persecution is "more likely than not" as opposed to "well-founded." David Stewart notes, "because
adherence to the Convention would require (rather than permit) non-refoulement ... the more stringent standard was
considered the appropriate referent as a matter of domestic law." Article 3, interpreted in conjunction with this
reservation, precludes the United States from extraditing suspected pirates to Kenya if it is "more likely than not" that
they will be subjected to torture.

Although no limitation on the territorial application of Article 3 is referenced in the reservation itself, the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations Report on UNCAT ("Senate Committee Report"), accompanying the domestic law
setting UNCAT into force, presents interpretations of the Article 3 reservation which also constrain its extraterritorial
application. First, the Senate Committee Report clarifies its Article 3 interpretation by stating that the
non-refoulement prohibition applies to "expulsion or return of persons in the United States to a particular State, and
does not grant a ... to avoid expulsion to other States." The first clause may limit the application of
Article 3 protections to those detained within the territory of United States. Read with the second clause, "to avoid
expulsion to other States," the interpretation appears to affirmatively foreclose extraterritorial application.

The United States has adopted a more limited interpretation of its non-refoulement obligations in practice as well.
In its report to the Committee Against Torture ("Committee"), the adjudicative body of UNCAT, the United States
reiterated its Article 3 obligations to not transfer persons to countries where it is "more likely than not" that they will be
subject to torture. However, in certain cases, the United States will extradite an individual to states where torture is
a concern after securing assurances from a foreign government that it will not torture the transferred individual.

In its response to the U.S. report, the Committee criticized reliance on diplomatic assurances and questioned the
United States' commitment to the spirit of the non-refoulement provision. Moreover, the Committee expressed
concern that the United States considers the non-refoulement provision not to extend to individuals detained outside its
de jure territory. The Committee provided two recommendations. First, the United States' UNCAT jurisdiction
should apply to all persons "under the effective control of its authorities, of whichever type, wherever located in the
world." Second, the United States should apply the non-refoulement guarantee to all detainees in its custody.
The recommendations may have limited impact; the United States does not currently accept the Committee's
jurisdiction. While the United States will "recognize and accept the Committee to investigate any reliable reports it may
receive indicating a systematic practice of torture in the United States ... [it] will not, at least at this point, accept
the competence of the Committee to consider individual complaints of treaty violations." 

With regard to the MOU, two issues emerge from this examination of the United States' perceived obligations under UNCAT: First, whether the prevailing interpretation limits the application of non-refoulement protections under UNCAT to suspected pirates aboard American vessels in the Gulf of Aden; second, if UNCAT applies, whether the United States is precluded from extraditing suspected pirates captured in the Gulf of Aden to Kenya for prosecution where evidence exists of officially sanctioned torture.

IV. The Case for Extraterritorial Application of UNCAT

Despite American reservations made to UNCAT, persuasive authority suggests that both the text of the treaty and
customary international law require extraterritorial application of UNCAT's Article 3 non-refoulement provisions. At
the outset, prohibition of torture is considered a preeminent, jus cogens norm of international law "from which no
derogation is permitted." As an extension of the jus cogens prohibition of torture, non-refoulement is a "principle of
customary international law by which a person may not be returned to a country where he or she may face persecution
or be subject to torture." Professor Alice Farmer notes, "for several decades, authorities have held that
non-refoulement is a principle of customary international law, and is binding on all states regardless of specific assent,
an assertion that demonstrates the acceptance of non-refoulement by the international community of states as a whole."
aside, even in circumstances that would justify derogation [*207] from other rights." n96

With respect to the extradition of suspected pirates to prosecuting nations, "the decisive factor cannot be the place where the person concerned [is] located ... rather, the only point at issue is whether the person concerned is under the control of state institutions or is affected by their actions." n97 Author Krishna Parsad posits "without such extraterritorial application ... the purpose behind UNCAT, to prevent torture, cannot be satisfied because it allows states to renge on their international obligations." n98 Recalling that treaties "shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with ... [their] object and purpose," n99 it is difficult to argue that the United States, as the capturing state, may be exempted from its non-refoulement obligations where detained pirates may be tortured in Kenya. n100

Rulings from other adjudicative bodies conform to the Committee's recommendation that Article 3 protections have extraterritorial effect vis-a-vis interpretation of similar human rights treaties. n101 Europe has struggled with the extraterritorial application of non-refoulement provisions contained in the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"). The landmark holding from the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") regarding the extraterritorial application of ECHR came in the 1996 case Loizidou v. Turkey. n102 The Court held in Loizidou that ECHR applied wherever a state exercised "effective control of an area outside its national territory," n103 locating the nexus for extraterritorial application of human rights treaties in [*208] the projection of sovereign power, rather than in particular geographic boundaries. n104

In the 2008 case Saadi v. Italy, n105 the ECtHR handed down a strong reaffirmance of Loizidou and confirmed the non-derogability of the non-refoulement provisions of ECHR. In Saadi, the petitioner was extradited to Tunisia after the Italian government secured diplomatic assurances from Tunisia that the petitioner would not be tortured. n106 The petitioner contended that it was common knowledge that the Tunisian government engaged in torture, a belief confirmed by both the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International. n107 Upon extradition, the petitioner was subjected to torture and the Court held that Italy had violated the non-refoulement provision of ECHR. n108 It its disapproval of the Italian stance, the Court noted that where a substantial likelihood for torture exists, diplomatic assurances may never derogate ECHR's non-refoulement provisions, n109 and where a state exerts control over an individual in custody, the ECHR's non-refoulement protections are absolute. n110

The U.S. Supreme Court has reached the opposite conclusion regarding the extraterritorial application of non-refoulement provisions. In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the non-refoulement provisions of the U.N. Conventions Relating to the Status of Refugees did not apply to actions taken by the Coast Guard in the international waters. n111 The ruling relied heavily on the text and the negotiating history of the treaty to find a lack of affirmative language suggesting extraterritorial application. n112 This decision has been subject to extraordinary criticism, n113 most prominently from the dissent noting that the [*209] ruling would effectively "eviscerate" the treaty's non-refoulement provisions. n114

The Committee has repeatedly clarified that the intent of UNCAT includes the extraterritorial application of Article 3. n115 The Committee response to the United States, referenced above, was explicit in its affirmation of UNCAT's application to all individuals under the effective control of the state party. n116 In the case of extradition and rendition, this has grown into an understanding that human rights protections must apply in cases where a state exerts authority over an individual, a standard referenced by the Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, and scholars. n117 These sources provide ample evidence to support a proposition that Article 3 obligations of United States apply extraterritorially, and are non-derogable by diplomatic assurances from partner states. The notion that actions of the United States in international waters escape the reach of UNCAT's non-refoulement provisions is challenged by customary law, the intent of UNCAT, and legal interpretations suggesting otherwise. This conclusion necessarily implicates the legality of the MOU, leaving only the question of the likelihood that suspected pirates will face torture upon extradition to Kenya.

V. Evidence of Torture in Kenyan Prisons and the Legality of the MOU
The United States Department of State has documented serious human rights abuses in Kenya. A 2008 report released by the Department of State included the revelation that "police frequently used violence and torture during interrogations and as punishment [for] pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners." Common methods of torture in prisons included "whipping, burning with cigarettes, and beating with gun butts and wooden clubs." The 2007 Department of State report was similarly damning, finding that "torture in prisons was commonplace and inflicted openly ... while prison and detention center conditions continued to be harsh and life threatening." A statement released by the Special Rapporteur for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights confirms many of these findings, and condemns a lack of impetus for any meaningful reform.

Reports detail a severely backlogged Kenyan legal system; the Chief Justice has admitted to a judicial backlog of nearly one million criminal cases, resulting in detainees "spending more than three years in prison before their trials [are] completed." Data compiled by international NGOs, like the Independent Medico-Legal Unit, reveal that by 2006 Kenyan prisons were at over 243% capacity and guards routinely used torture to subdue the incarcerated population. The BBC documented further abuses, noting in a 2003 report that "brutality and negligence ... is the hallmark of jails throughout Kenya," while Voice of America reported that suspected pirates held in the Shimon la Tewa prison were mostly juveniles with untreated open wounds.

The European Union has bankrolled efforts by the United Nations to revamp the Kenyan criminal justice and prison system in response to criticism of bilateral extradition agreements. In particular, Shimo La Tewa Prison "has received several upgrades including mattresses for the prisoners." Professor James Thuo Gathii notes, the United Nations "is essentially retrofitting the Kenyan criminal justice system, which is already heavily backlogged and bedeviled by basic problems such as inadequate prison space[.]

In order for an individual to claim relief under Article 3 of UNCAT, he must demonstrate that his pain is not the result of lawful sanctions, and that the Article 1 definition of torture is satisfied. At minimum, credible reports generated by the U.S. Department of State, the United Nations, NGOs and the news media may implicate the United States' Article 3 definition of torture. The MOU, at best, appears to rest on unsteady legal grounds.

Conclusion

The Kenya-United States MOU should be closely scrutinized to determine whether the United States is in violation of its obligations as a state party to UNCAT. If the torture of extradited suspected pirates in Kenya is more likely than not, the United States should no longer honor the MOU. While many states party to UNCAT have signed similar agreements with Kenya, this does not release the United States is not released from its responsibility to honor human rights. The Convention Against Torture, notwithstanding alternate interpretations by the United States, protects all individuals from torture, regardless of geographic or jurisdictional conditions. This intent is buttressed both by preemptory norms of international law and case law.

Although this essay has not specifically addressed legal alternatives to battling piracy, they are already available. Until a favorable regional solution is presented, American civilian courts are capable of adjudicating trials of suspected pirates under domestic law, despite the obstacles and expense involved. In the long term, some have suggested the establishment of piracy tribunals in the region, similar to the International Criminal Court, where suspected pirates would receive protections under international law.

Policy considerations for ceasing extradition of suspected pirates to Kenya exist in surplus. Journalist Alisha Ryu articulates the precarious situation noting, "charges of mistreatment or abuse of suspected Somali pirates brought to Kenya under a vague, little publicized agreement could again stir up anger and resentment among Muslims.
and Somalis and the region." n136 The torture of captured pirates will further call into question the motives and values of our efforts, and the efforts of the developed world, to suppress piracy. n137

Perhaps the image of pirates as "enemies of all humanity" has prevented the public from examining the United States' non-refoulement duties under UNCAT. In the not so distant past, pirates were exempt entirely from basic human protections. n138 Professor Kontorovic suggests that by using Kenya as a "go-to state for piracy prosecution," the United States is willing to sacrifice human security for suspected pirates in exchange for convenience and expediency. n139 The ramifications of this decision are manifold. The ratification of treaties like UNCAT demonstrates that even pirates must be afforded basic human rights. The torture of suspected pirates extradited by the United States should place our desire for justice in sharp relief with a concern for human dignity.

Legal Topics:

For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:
Immigration LawAsylum & Related ReliefConvention Against TortureInternational LawSources of International LawInternational LawSovereign States & IndividualsHuman RightsTorture

FOOTNOTES:


n4. Id.


n11. UNCAT, supra note 9, at art. 3(1).

n12. Id. at preamble (emphasis added).


n15. The tanker Maersk Alabama was hijacked and its crew held for ransom by four Somali nationals in April 2009. The event was covered extensively by the news media after Navy snipers killed three of the four pirates holding the captain of the Maersk Alabama hostage. See, e.g., Robert McFadden and Scott Shane, Navy Rescues Captain, Killing 3 Pirate Captors, N.Y. Times, April 13, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 6869798; Mark Gazette and Sharon Otterman, U.S. Captain Is Hostage of Pirates, N.Y. Times, April 9, 2009, at A6, available at 2009 WLNR 6612883.


n17. U.S. Navy lawyer Michael Bahar has postulated that hijackings on the high seas could be motivated by a political desire to punish the developed Western nations, and could ultimately bankroll terrorists. Bahar, supra note 8, at 26; See also Douglas Burgess, Jr., Piracy Is Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 2008, at A33, available at 2008 WLNR 23389243 (advocating a single legal definition for pirates and terrorists based on shared qualities and motivations).


n21. Id.

n22. Id.

n24. Id.

n25. Dutton, supra note 13, at 216.

n26. Id.; see also see Craig Whitlock, Lack of Prosecution Poses Challenge for Foreign Navies that Catch Somali Pirates, The Washington Post, May 24, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/23/AR2010052303893_pf.html. ("The European Union's naval forces caught 275 pirates off the coast of Somalia in March and April [of 2010] but released 235 of them after confiscating their weapons, said Anders Kallin, a Swedish navy commander and spokesman for the E.U. forces... . In the same period, the U.S. Navy ... caught 39 Somali pirates and released 18 of them.").


n29. Id. at 200.

n30. Kontorovic, supra note 2, at 255.

n31. "The agreement between the US and the Government of Kenya was memorialized in a Memorandum of Understanding dated January 16, 2009, and describes the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates and property captured in the western Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea." Dutton, supra note 13, at 216 n.125 (citing Piracy Against U.S. Flagged Vessels: Lessons Learned: Hearing Before the House


n33. "As of October 2009, Kenya was host to about 123 piracy suspects, ten of whom have been tried and sentenced." Dutton, supra note 13, at 220.


n37. Isanga, supra note 27, at 1276.

n38. Krishma Parsad, Illegal Renditions and Improper Treatment: An Obligation to Provide Refugee


n42. The Dutch philosopher Hugo Grotius posited there was no need to justify war against pirates because it was not customary or necessary to declare war "against tyrants, robbers, pirates, and all persons who do not form part of a foreign state." Gathii, supra note 34, at 1328 (quoting Hugo Grotius, De Iure Praedae Commentarius 218 (James Brown Scott ed., Gladys L. Williams & Walter H. Zeydel trans., Oceana Publ'ns, Inc. 1964) (1604)); see also Gopalan and Switzer, Pirates of the Aden: A Tale of Law's Impotence 21-22 (working paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1404506 (citing Codification of International Law: Part V, A Collection of Piracy Laws of Various Countries, 29 Am. J. of Int'l L. 887, 910 (1932)).


n44. Gathii, supra note 34, at 1331.

transporting pirates, evidence and witnesses to appear in their courts as a reason patrolling navies do not take custody of pirates); see also Brian Wilson, Fighting Pirates: The Pen and the Sword, World Pol'y J., Winter 2008, at 45, available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/wopj.2009.25.4.41 (noting the "great expanse and logistical and legal burdens of transporting the pirates to a Western country for prosecution").


n48. UNCLOS was sent to the U.S. Senate for ratification in October 2007. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted in her confirmation hearing that one of her top priorities included ratification of UNCLOS. Transcript of Sec’y of State Designate Hillary Rodham Clinton's Confirmation Hearings, January 13, 2009, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/18225/transcript_of_hillary_clintons_confirmation_hearing.html.

n49. UNCLOS, supra note 47, art. 105.

n50. Passman, supra note 40, at 16.


n52. "In Francis Lieber's Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, a foundational document of the modern law of war, pirates are specifically used as an example of combatants who deserve no protection." Passman, supra note 40, at 17 (citing Richard Jackson, The Law of War and the Academy, 14 New Eng. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 3 (2007)).

n53. Passman, supra note 40, at 18.
n54. Kontorovic, supra note 2, at 257.

n55. Id. at 257 n.110.

n56. Id. at 257.

n57. David Stewart comments that although the Convention is not "the first international instrument to criminalize acts violating internationally recognized human rights, it is one of the most specific and comprehensive." David Stewart, The Torture Convention and the Reception of International Criminal Law Within the United States, 15 Nova L. Rev. 449, 449 (1991).

n58. UNCAT, supra note 9, at preamble.

n59. Stewart, supra note 57, at 452.

n60. Id.; see also Parsad, supra note 38, at 684.

n61. UNCAT supra note 9, at art. 1.

n62. Id. at arts. 1-3.

n63. Parsad, supra note 38, at 683.

n65. Id. at art. 31(1).

n66. Id. at art. 31(2)(a).

n67. Id. at art. 31(3)(a).

n68. Id. at art. 31(3)(b).

n69. Id. at art. 31(3)(c).

n70. Id. at arts. 32(a), 32(b).


n72. "Jurisdiction clauses are contained in articles 2(1), 5(1)(a), 5(2), 7(1), 11, 12, 13, 16, 22(1) of UNCAT." Id. at 414.

n73. UNCAT, supra note 9, art. 1.

n74. Id. at art. 5(1)(a).
n75. Executive Session before the United States Senate, 101st Cong., at S17490 (October 27, 1990) [hereinafter Executive Session].


n77. Executive Session, supra note 75 (emphasis added).

n78. Senate Committee Report, supra note 76, at 16-17.


n80. Senate Committee Report, supra note 76, at 16.

n81. Stewart, supra note 57, at 458.


n83. Stewart, supra note 57, at 458.

n84. Senate Committee Report, supra note 76, at 16.
n85. Id. (emphasis added).


n87. Id.


n89. Id. at para. 15.

n90. Id.

n91. Id. at para. 20.

n92. Stewart, supra note 57, at 469.

n93. U.N. Office of the High Comm'n for Human Rights, Comm'n on Human Rights, Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24: Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, P 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 4, 1997); see, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702; Steven Ackerman, Torture and Other Forms of Cruel and Unusual Punishment in International Law, 11 Vand. J. Transnat'l. L. 653 (1978).
n94. Parsad, supra note 38, at 682 (citing Sir Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement, in Refugee Protection in International Law 163-64 (Erika Feller, Volker Turk & Frances Nicholson eds., Cambridge University Press 2003) (2001) (describing that the customary norm of non-refoulement prohibits return of a person to a country where there are "substantial grounds" for asserting that the person will be subject to torture)).

n95. "While commentators initially differed on the extent to which non-refoulement should be considered a principle of customary international law, it is now settled that the principle is of a fundamentally norm-creating character such that it can be used to form the basis of a general rule of law." Farmer, supra note 10, at 24 (internal citations omitted).; see North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den./F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, at paras. 37, 63 (Feb. 20) (distinguishing between being bound by "specific assent" by ratifying a treaty and being bound by customary international law which is automatic and does not require assent and to which no reservations may be made); see also VCLT, supra note 64, art. 53.

n96. Farmer, supra note 10, at 25.

n97. Andreas Fischer-Lescano, et. al., Border Controls at Sea: Requirements Under International Human Rights And Refugee Law, 21 Int'l J. Refugee L. 256, 267-68 (noting "there can be no place outside the country of origin of the person concerned where the [treaty's] non-refoulement principle does not apply - whether this be on a state's own territory, at its borders, beyond national borders, in transit zones or in areas declared as international zones.").

n98. Parsad, supra note 38, at 689.

n99. VCLT, supra note 64, at art. 31(1).

n100. Id.

n101. Discussion surrounding non-refoulement often occurs in the context of refugee and immigration law with regards to treaties specifically protecting refugees and asylum seekers seeking admission into a host state. In the United States, UNCAT protections are most often utilized in the immigration context to prevent the removal ("withholding of removal") of an individual to a country where she will likely face torture. The applicability of non-refoulement arguments made in the refugee law arena to discussions of extraditions at issue
in this essay is widely recognized. Fischer-Lescano, supra note 97, at 267; see Stewart, supra note 57, at 457-58.


n103. Id. at para. 62.

n104. Milanovic, supra note 71, at 425.


n106. Id. at para. 54.

n107. Id. at paras. 82, 98, 99.

n108. Id. at para. 114.

N109. Id. at para. 127.

n110. Id. at para. 138.

n112. Id. at 180.

n113. See, e.g., Lori A. Nessel, Externalized Borders and the Invisible Refugee, 40 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 625 (2009); Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 Yale L.J. 39, 43 (1994) (noting that the majority of the Court applied a presumption against extraterritoriality, notwithstanding that the statute at issue was enacted pursuant to a multilateral treaty and without "acknowledging the primacy of the principle of nonrefoulement in customary international law"); Harold Hongju Koh, Reflections on Refoulement, 35 Hastings Int'l L.J. 1 (1994).

n114. Id., dissent at 196.; See, Fischer-Lescano, et. al., supra note 97, at 266 (discussing the political nature of the ruling and its departure from accepted methods of treaty interpretation).

n115. CAT Response, supra note 88.

n116. Id. at para.15.

n117. Id.; See also Milanovic, supra note 71, at 447 (discussing human rights treaty jurisdiction application to any place where a state exercises power over a territory and its inhabitants).


n119. Id.

n120. Id.


n123. Id.


n127. Gathii, supra note 34, at 1353.

n128. Id.

n129. Id.


n131. Id.

n133. Dutton, supra note 13, at 220.

n134. Gopalan and Switzer, supra note 42, at 21.

n135. Bahar, supra note 8, at 81-83.


n137. Passman, supra note 40, at 39.

n138. Gopalan and Switzer, supra note 42, at 11.

n139. Kontorovic, supra note 2, at 270.